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We conduct a natural ﬁeld experiment on direct and indirect trans-
fer mechanisms for small donations. Charitable contributions are sig-
niﬁcantly higher if made indirectly, i.e. if they are tied to the purchase
of a good sold at a premium, than if they are made directly. Donations
are signiﬁcantly higher under both transfer mechanisms if people are
given a suggested reference donation.
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11 Introduction
Charitable donations are frequently linked to the purchase of a good that may
be unrelated to the charitable cause. For instance, 10 % of the price of books
purchased from “Amazon” through the “Food for Life Global” (FFL) website
will go to that charity. “Heartfelt Charity Cards” gives 10% of their greeting
cards sales to the charity chosen by the customer. The German Mail oﬀers
’charity stamps’ at a premium which goes to charity. Other examples include
a brewery that remits 1 Euro from every sale of a crate of beer to the World
Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) or festivals where a part of the proceeds
from food, beverage or ticket sales are given to charitable causes.1 Why
do charities engage in these activities rather than seeking donations directly
through remittances, donation boxes etc.? This indirect mode of mobilizing
resources is potentially more costly as it requires to organize or cooperate
with a diﬀerent economic activity, which serves as a “donation vehicle”. Could
the indirect mechanism, though more costly, be more eﬀective in mobilizing
small charitable donations? Could the channel through which people give
matter as such?
This is the concern of the paper. We report on a natural ﬁeld experiment,
in which we test whether the propensity to give is diﬀerent if the transfer
is linked to the purchase of a good rather than if made directly through a
donation box. Thus we test for the diﬀerent eﬀectiveness of the direct and
indirect transfer mechanism to mobilize resources through small donations.
A growing literature inquires into the determinants of charitable givings
and contributions to public goods (see Andreoni (2008) and Bekkers and
Wiepking (2007)). One strand of the literature analyzes empirically the socio-
economic factors such as gender, income, age, religion etc. (for a survey cf.
Schokkaert (2006)). Another, less developed strand looks at the situational
determinants. In dictator games, which are similar to situations of charitable
1Cf. http://www.ﬄ.org/ﬄ_donation_business.php, http://www.charitycards.com,
http://www.wohlfahrtsmarken.de, http://www.krombacher.de/regenwald/.
2giving, and in public good games it has been shown that giving is lower the
larger the social distance to and the degree of anonymity of the recipient
(inter alia, Charness and Gneezy (2008), Brañas-Garza (2007), Brañas-Garza
and Espinosa (2006), Hoﬀman et al. (1996)). Brañas-Garza (2006) shows
that giving increases with the neediness of the recipient and is higher if given
as medicine rather than as money. Individuals tend to give more if their
giving/contribution is observable (Andreoni and Petrie (2004) and Rege and
Telle (2004) for public good laboratory experiments, List et al. (2004) for
a laboratory experiment and Soetevent (2005) for a natural experiment on
charitable giving). Conformity have been shown to matter for contributions.
Suggested or stated ‘normal’ donations aﬀect both the probability and the
amount of donations (Alpizar et al. (2008), Shang and Croson (in press), and
Desmet and Feinberg (2003)).
A special situation for charitable giving is the gift exchange, in which
the person collecting contributions ﬁrst makes a small gift to the potential
donor and then asks for a donation. Empirical evidence is mixed – while Falk
(2007), Edlund et al. (2007) and Harris et al. (1973) ﬁnd a positive impact
on the donations, Alpizar et al. (2008) observe a higher probability of giving,
but a lower amount, thereby making the gift not worthwhile. Chen et al.
(2006) ﬁnd no eﬀect. Briers et al. (2007) combine a gift exchange game with
reference prices and ﬁnd that donations go up if the reference price for the
token gift is not too high.
The paper that comes closest to our approach, but diﬀers considerably
in focus and method is Holmes et al. (2002). They solicit contributions to
charity from 100 campus students. In two control treatments they ask for
donations of at least one and three dollars, respectively. In the second set of
treatments they sell candles at three dollars with one dollar going to charity.
The price of the candle is advertised as (i) a ‘fair’ price (i.e. allegedly similar
to most stores in the area), (ii) a ‘bargain price’ (i.e. allegedly one dollar
cheaper than in the stores) and (iii) an ‘altruist’s price’ (i.e. allegedly one
dollar higher than in the stores) and the recipients of the donation (emo-
3tionally disturbed children) are portrayed as either in low or in high need.
For high need recipients they ﬁnd that the willingness to purchase the candle
is much higher if the purchase is considered a bargain than if it is a fair
deal or even a deal at the altruist’s price. In the latter case, the implicit
donation is no higher than in the case of a donation without the sale of a
candle, whereas it is higher if the candle purchase is considered a bargain.
For low need individuals direct donations are more eﬀective than the implicit
donations through candle sales.
Holmes et al. (2002) compare direct donations with a purchase cum do-
nation at a price three times the donation and thus very diﬀerent activities.
Which alternative mobilizes more resources depends on the perceived prop-
erties of the purchased good as subjects need to decide buying the good in
order to make the donation. Contrary to that we focus on the mechanism
of resource mobilization only. In our example people have already made the
decision to purchase a good and we investigate whether they are more in-
clined to give if it takes the form of a price premium of that good or if it is
made separately in a donation box next to the cashier. Thus their decision
to donate is independent of the decision to purchase a speciﬁc good. More-
over, we use more than 5000 subjects from all walks of life rather than 100
students.2
The treatments of our natural ﬁeld experiment3 are located inside diﬀer-
ent coﬀee shops of a chain of identical coﬀee shops, which makes it easy to
hold constant other factors inﬂuencing the decision to donate (prices, com-
position of patrons, range and quality of products oﬀered, observability of
the donation etc.). We conducted ﬁve treatments – three with the indirect
and two with the direct transfer mechanism. For two of the treatments we
suggested a donation (direct or indirect), for two we did not, and for the ﬁfth
treatment we set a ﬁxed surcharge for the indirect donation (which is equal
2Holmes et al. (2002) asked 100 students to donate in a 5x2 design, which leads to
approximately 10 subjects per condition.
3The classiﬁcation follows Harrison and List (2004).
4to the suggested surcharge). That allows us to study the eﬀect of a reference
on the amount of donations.4
We ﬁnd that in both treatments – with and without reference – the in-
direct transfer mechanism mobilized signiﬁcantly more resources than the
direct and that the average donation was higher if a suggested donation was
given. Our ﬁndings raise interesting questions for the behavioral determi-
nants of giving and provide insights for the design of fundraising.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section we describe the design
of our experiment; Section 3 presents the results. The last Section summa-
rizes and draws conclusions.
2 Design
2.1 General Setup
We are interested in determining whether there is a diﬀerence in the will-
ingness to make small donations through the direct and the indirect transfer
mechanism.5 Small direct donations in the real world are typically made by
putting coins (or bills) into donation boxes. Alternatively, donations can be
made indirectly through the purchase of a good that is sold at a premium
with this premium going to charity.
There are three challenges with comparing these mechanisms. First, that
the decision to donate should not be inﬂuenced by the character of the good
in the indirect treatment; second, all other determinants for charitable giv-
ing should be the same in all treatments and, third, the experiment should
4Our notion of reference is closely related to the discussion on conformity on giving
in the literature (Alpizar et al. (2008), Shang and Croson (in press), and Desmet and
Feinberg (2003)), but strictly speaking not the same. We implement a precise suggestion
rather than stating an adjusted premium. It is a reference from the donors point of view.
Hence, we choose reference instead of suggestion or conformity.
5Large donations are typically made through remittances and checks and thus do not
lend themselves to such experiments.
5portray actual behavior in a realistic setting rather than hypothetical behav-
ior. If the good is purchased in the indirect transfer treatment, but not in
the direct transfer treatment, results may strongly depend on the perceived
quality of the product. That is in essence what Holmes et al. (2002) show. If
people do not like the product, they may not purchase it even though they
are willing to make a donation in principle. Conversely, if the product is very
attractive they may buy it also at a surcharge and not care about donating.
We have chosen a setting for our experiment that allows us to meet these
challenges. All treatments were conducted in diﬀerent coﬀee shops of the
same coﬀee shop chain “Coﬀee Bay”.6 Thus, product range, product quality
and prices are identical. The interior is very similar and the coﬀee shops
used in our experiments are located at very similar places in the centers of
diﬀerent towns.7 As we used coﬀee shops in diﬀerent towns patrons of the
coﬀee shop were highly unlikely to know about other treatments. The towns
in which the chosen coﬀee shops are located have a comparable structure and
size; we visited each coﬀee shop prior to the experiment and could not see
any diﬀerence in the composition of patrons. The setting of the experiment
was natural: Subjects visited the coﬀee shop as part of their (daily) routine
and were not aware that an experiment was conducted.
Signs and material announcing the possibility for donation were of equal
size and color in all treatments so that the level of awareness and information
was the same. At the same time the signs were not visible from the outside
so that people were not attracted to enter the shop by the possibility to
donate through a speciﬁc channel.8 In other words, individuals entering the
coﬀee shop had already decided to buy one of the products oﬀered and were
then confronted with a (treatment-speciﬁc) possibility to donate. Thus the
6Coﬀee-Bay is a franchising company with nine shops in various cities in Germany, cf.
http://www.coﬀee-bay.com/.
7We found suitable venues in Mainz, Koblenz, Gießen, Marburg and Göttingen; for a
description see http://www.coﬀee-bay.de/bars.htm
8Example settings are shown in Appendix A.
6decision to buy the good was not linked to the decision to donate.
We used the following protocol: Each coﬀee shop was sent a letter with in-
structions (see Appendix B), which all sales persons were requested to read.9
One of us (Hannes Koppel) went to all shops before the treatments started
to clarify the setup and to answer questions. The treatments were conducted
over a period of one week with observations recorded on Tuesdays, Wednes-
days and Thursdays. The introduction of a new alternative (beverages sold
at a premium, donation box etc.) was clearly marked through signs and
material provided by the charity organization directly at the counter where
the products were sold. Donations went to MISEREOR, a very well known
charity organization in Germany; we clearly indicated the charity and the
speciﬁc project to which the donation was going.10 We used a standard type
of donation box, which is easily recognizable and widely used for charitable
donations at counters or in street collections. All sales personnel was specif-
ically instructed not to proactively advertise the new alternative, but to ask
each customer if she or he had recognized the new possibility. Therefore
people were clearly aware of the alternative, but did not feel pressured to opt
for it.
2.2 Five Treatments
We conducted ﬁve independent treatments, three for the indirect (TI) and
two for the direct (TD) transfer mechanism. The ﬁrst indirect treatment
(TI0) is identical to the indirect donations that are found in reality. Individ-
uals were given the choice between buying their beverage at the regular price
and buying it at a ﬁxed premium which goes to charity.11 Direct donations
9A translation is given in Appendix B.
10It is a relief project for small-scale producers in Haiti (P22302), for details of the
project see http://www.misereor.de/Projekte.8492.0.html?&no_cache=1.
11In reality people may only have the choice of buying the good with the charitable
premium and a close substitute at a lower price. For example, people can buy regular
stamps instead of charity stamps sold with a surcharge.
7in the real world are typically made by putting money in a donation box,
where people can freely choose the amount they want to give.
If we directly compared these two ways to make donations, we would com-
pare realistic alternatives, but we would not be able to single out a possible
eﬀect of the transfer mechanism. In the indirect treatment, individuals can-
not choose the amount of the donation whereas they can (and must) choose
it in the direct transfer. Since references have been shown to inﬂuence giving
behavior [Alpizar et al. (2008), Shang and Croson (in press), and Desmet
and Feinberg (2003)], – and a ﬁxed donation in TI0 is the strongest form
of a reference – such a comparison would observe the combined eﬀect of the
diﬀerent channels of donation and the existence of a reference.
In order to separate these two eﬀects we conducted a second and a third
indirect treatment: in treatment TI1 we suggested a premium (that was
equal to the ﬁxed premium in TI0), but let people ultimately decide about
the premium they wished to pay. In treatment TI2 we did not provide
a suggestion, but gave the individuals the choice how much to donate by
choosing their premium freely. In order to compare the direct and the indirect
transfer appropriately we designed two parallel direct treatments: In TD1 we
suggested a donation (equal to the amount of the premium in TI0 and TI1),
whereas in TD2 we did not.12 Therefore, by comparing TI1 with TD1 and
TI2 with TD2 we can analyze what a possible impact of the channel of
donation is with and without reference. By comparing TI1 with TI2 and
also TD1 with TD2 we can see what the eﬀect of a reference is under direct
and indirect transfers.
Coﬀee Bay oﬀers bagels and drinks (coﬀee of all sorts, tea and chocolate).
For technical reasons indirect transfers could only be made through purchases
of beverages.13 Direct donations could be made also by people who did not
12Obviously we cannot restrict customers to put a speciﬁc amount of money in the
donation box only. So there is no parallel treatment to TI0.
13Every beverage was billed as such so that we could measure exactly the number of
drinks sold. For the bagels, the diﬀerent components of the bagels were billed separately,
8purchase beverages. That could introduce a bias in the results, when we
normalize the amount of donations by the number of beverages sold: average
direct donations would be overestimated. In our case that turns out not to
be a problem as direct donations are signiﬁcantly smaller than indirect ones.
If there is a bias at all, the true diﬀerence would only be bigger than the
measured one.14
Prices for the beverages range between 1.40 Euro for tea and 3.05 Euro for
a triple coﬀee mocca. We decided to use 30 Eurocents as the ﬁxed premium
in TI0 and the suggested donation in TI1 and TD1, as the share of donation
is in line with what is found in real world examples. Our ﬁve treatments can
thus be summarized as:15
Treatment 1 (TI0):
Customers could choose between buying beverages at the regular price and
buying beverages with a ﬁxed premium of 30 Eurocents.
Treatment 2 (TI1):
Customers could choose between buying beverages at the regular price and
buying beverages with a premium. A premium of 30 Eurocents was sug-
gested, but individuals were free not to follow the suggestion.
Treatment 3 (TI2):
Customers could choose between buying beverages at the regular price and
buying beverages with a premium, which they could freely choose.
Treatment 4 (TD1):
Customers were oﬀered the possibility to make a donation in a donation box
at the counter. A donation of 30 Eurocents was suggested, but individuals
which did not allow to trace back the number of bagels sold. Since donations on bagel
sales would not have allowed us to normalize the donations by the number of sales, we
disallowed premiums on bagel sales.
14Conversations with the sales personnel and our own casual observations convinced us
that very few people buy bagels without purchasing a drink at the same time.
15Photos of the signs introducing diﬀerent treatments can be found in the appendix.
The designs of the signs were as similar as possible.
9were free not to follow the suggestion.
Treatment 5 (TD2):
Customers were oﬀered the possibility to make a donation in a donation box
at the counter. There was no suggestion on the amount of a donation.
These ﬁve treatments allow to analyze the eﬀect of a reference and whether
a possible eﬀect depends on the transfer mechanism (direct versus indirect).
More importantly, it allows to analyze the eﬀect of the transfer mechanism
in a situation with and without reference.
This is summarized in Table 1:
TD1 TD2 TI1




suggested don. (with suggestion)
TI2 mechanism reference
no suggested don. (without suggestion) (indirect)
TD1 reference
suggested don. (direct)
Table 1: Treatments and testable eﬀects
As pointed out earlier, prices, products, composition of subjects, time and
location are the same for all treatments. There is no obvious diﬀerence in
transaction costs of making the donation. People have to open their purse to
pay for their purchases and it should make no diﬀerence whether they donate
in the box (located directly at the counter) or pay a premium. Likewise the
observability of the donation by others is the same in all treatments: The
donation is observable at the moment it is made, but not before or after. Thus
we should expect the transfer channel to have no eﬀect on the donation. Yet
it has.
103 Results
Table 2 reports the beverages sales and the total donations for each treat-
ment. Except for the treatment TI0, in which donations were restricted to
30 Eurocent per beverage, we do not observe individual donations, but only
the total amount of donations at the end of the experimental period.16






Table 2: Sales Statistics of Treatments 1 to 5
In our context that is of little consequence since we are interested in
possible diﬀerences of the total amount of resources mobilized per beverage
purchase, which we do observe. We thus essentially compare diﬀerences in
per purchase donations by comparing imputed distributions of standardized
donations. For the donations in the unrestricted treatments (TI1, TI2, TD1,
TD2) we compute how many people would have donated the same total
amount if donations were restricted to 30 Eurocent as in the case of indirect
donations with a ﬁxed premium (TI0). We then use nonparametric tests
to compare the means of the distributions.We thereby account for diﬀerent
numbers of subjects in the ﬁve treatments.
For instance in treatment TI1, total donations summed up to 109.70 Eu-
ros (cf. Table 2). That is a donation of 4.48 Eurocent per beverage purchase.
16One might argue that outliers could have produced the eﬀects. Information on the
donation composition for the donation box make this highly unlikely. We found no bills
and only a few coins with a higher value in treatments TD1 and TD2. The same is true for
the indirect treatments. Moreover, the biggest eﬀect is found for the indirect treatment
with a ﬁxed premium (TI0), which does not allow for outliers.
11If each individual were restricted to a 30 Eurocent donation per beverage pur-
chase, the sum of 109.70 Euros would have been achieved if 365.67 (rounded
to 366) beverages out of the 2447 were purchased with a premium of 30 Eu-
rocent in that treatment. Thus, when comparing treatments TI0 and TI1 we
compare the actual distribution of treatment TI0 with 300 beverages sold at
a premium of 30 Eurocent and 1203 beverages bought at the regular price –
donating nothing – with the imputed distribution in treatment TI1, in which
an imputed 366 out of 2447 beverages were purchased with a premium of 30
Eurocent. Analogical calculations are done for all treatments.
A ﬁrst impression of the diﬀerent inclination to give in the ﬁve treatments
is given by Figure 1. It denotes the average donation per beverage purchase
in each treatment. There is a marked diﬀerence between the direct and the
indirect transfer mechanism.
Figure 1: Average donations per beverage purchase
Results of Fisher’s exact test, that tests for mean diﬀerences, are shown
in Table 3.17 We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average donations per bever-
age purchase between treatment TI0 and all other treatments; Fisher’s exact
test rejects the null hypothesis of equal means in all cases at the one percent
17Numbers next to the treatment code denote the average donation per drink in Euro-
cent. For detailed test statistics see Appendix C.
12level of signiﬁcance, showing the superior eﬀectiveness of mobilizing resources
through indirect transfers with a ﬁxed premium. Comparing the treatments
that we observe in reality, i.e. TI0 and TD2, we ﬁnd that the indirect transfer
mechanism with a ﬁxed premium raises on average 5.99 Eurocent per bev-
erage purchased whereas the direct transfer mechanism without suggested
donation gives on average 1.63 Eurocent per beverage. That is less than a
third. In other words, the indirect transfer with a ﬁxed premium is much
more eﬀective than the direct transfer without any reference. Yet, as men-
tioned above, we measure two eﬀects simultaneously with such a comparison;
the indirect transfer mechanism and a very strict reference of 30 Eurocent.
Treatment TI1 TI2 TD1 TD2
Donation 4.48 2.34 3.00 1.63
TI0 5.99 p = .000 p = .000 p = .000 p = .000
TI1 4.48 p = .000 p = .012 p = .000
TI2 2.34 p = .258 p = .093
TD1 3.00 p = .001
Table 3: Fisher test results and average donations per beverage purchase
The indirect transfer mechanism without suggested donation (TI2) raises
on average 2.34 Eurocent per beverage purchase, which is signiﬁcantly higher
(at p = .012) than average donation of 1.63 Eurocents in the direct treatment
without suggested donation (TD2). Introducing a suggested donation of 30
Eurocent increase average donations for both mechanisms; direct donations
(TD1) raise on average 3.00 Eurocents and indirect donations (TI1) 4.48 Eu-
rocents. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the ten percent level (p = .093). In
sum, we ﬁnd that the indirect transfer mechanism raises signiﬁcantly more
resources than the direct one – regardless whether we compare sets of treat-
ments with or without reference.
References (a suggested donation) increase the average giving in both
transfer mechanisms signiﬁcantly and strongly. In the case of direct trans-
fers individuals donate signiﬁcantly more when given a suggested donation:
13Average donation per beverage purchase in TD1 is 84 percent higher than in
TD2. This diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the one percent level (p = .001). We ﬁnd
the same qualitative result for the indirect transfer mechanism (p = .000);
average indirect donation per purchase without reference is 2.34 Eurocent
while with a suggestion it is 4.48 Eurocent (or 91 percent higher) with a
suggestion of 30 Eurocent.
4 Conclusion
We have conducted a natural ﬁeld experiment on charitable giving focussing
on two mechanisms that coexist in reality. We ﬁnd that the indirect transfer
mechanism — the purchase of a good at a ﬁxed premium, which goes to
charity — is much more eﬀective in mobilizing resources than the direct
transfer mechanism, a donation box where people are free to put in any
amount they like.
That is an interesting and not necessarily intuitive result. In the treat-
ment with a ﬁxed premium people willing to donate less than the premium
will not donate, but they could in the treatment with the donation box as
it allows also for smaller donations. For that reason, the direct transfer
mechanism should produce a higher average donation.
We ﬁnd the opposite and show that it is the result of two eﬀects. First,
there is a positive reference eﬀect. When people were given a suggestion for
the amount of donation they gave more on average. This ﬁnding holds for the
direct and the indirect mechanism. In reality the indirect mechanism with
a ﬁxed premium provides the strongest possible reference whereas the direct
mechanism does not provide any. Thus the reference eﬀect explains part of
the observed diﬀerence. (Of course this ﬁnding depends on our choice of the
suggestion; if it is chosen too high or too low, the result may be reverse.)
Second, and more surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the mechanism as such plays
an important role for the mobilization of resources. We show that people
are signiﬁcantly more willing to give if donations are collected through a
14surcharge on the product purchased than through a donation box. This
ﬁnding holds in situations with and without reference and it is independent
of the product as subjects bought the product in both sets of treatments. This
novel transfer mechanism eﬀect does not suggest an apparent explanation, as
direct transaction costs, observability of the donation, and all other factors
are the same for both channels. We thus hypothesize on possible reasons for
this result.
A possible explanation would be that a price premium links the donation
to the purchase of the coﬀee etc. whereas the purchase of the coﬀee and the
donation in a donation box are regarded as two simultaneous, but indepen-
dent acts. Thus the ‘mental transaction costs’ could be diﬀerent. While in
the ﬁrst case the subject may feel he or she has to make one decision only, in
the second case he or she may consider the donation decision to be separate
and thus burdensome and may refrain from it with the consequence that no
donation is made. Such a link between the purchase and the donation may
also suggest a gift exchange type explanation. In the gift exchange the donor
receives a gift ﬁrst and then is more likely to make a contribution, or is more
likely to make a higher contribution. In our experiment the donor has de-
cided to buy a product and then is confronted with a donation possibility.
Yet, if people feel that the product is worth more to them than they have
paid for it (it contains a “gift component” for them), they may be inclined
to give something back in return. In other words, they may be more willing
to make a donation than they otherwise would be. Lastly, the communica-
tive act with the sales person could explain the diﬀerence. The sales person
makes people aware of the possibility to donate in every treatment and thus
sales person and consumer communicate about the possibility of donation in
all treatments. Yet only in the indirect treatments must people talk to the
sales person if they want to make a donation. This communicative act may
give them extra expressive utility (Hillman (2009)), which may lead to higher
donations. With our setup, we cannot distinguish between these alternative
explanations. Of course it would be desirable to identify the reason for the
15observed diﬀerential behavior. This is left for future reseach.
Our results are potentially important for the design of fundraising activ-
ities. We have shown that indirect transfers are signiﬁcantly more eﬀective
in mobilizing resources. It may thus be a better option to link donations to
purchases of goods than soliciting them directly. If both mechanisms are not
mutually exclusive, indirect transfers may be an eﬀective additional channel
to collect small donations. Even though we have investigated only charita-
ble contributions, our results may well carry over to situations of voluntary
contributions to public goods. Thus in order to raise money for a neighbor-
hood beautiﬁcation program it may be a better idea to sell coﬀee or cake at
neighborhood party at increased prices than to solicit contributions directly.
The same may hold for donations to local schools, national parks, etc. Yet
the indirect channel may prove more eﬀective in many other areas of pro




• Do not say anything about an experiment! Be as you normally are.
• The experiment is conducted over three days; Tuesday, Wednesday and
Thursday.
• Place the provided sign at the counter next to the point of sale.
• TD: Place the donation box next to the sign.
• Be extremely careful with the registration of the sales.
• It is very important that you do everything meticulously and with a
maximum of accuracy.
• TI: Paying a premium is possible for beverages only.
• TI0: You have to carefully distinguish between buying a beverage with-
out and with a premium. There is a button installed at the cash reg-
ister.
• Do not proactively advertise the new alternative, but ask each customer
if she or he had recognized the new possibility.
• If a consumer is asking why you are doing this never say anything about
an experiment. Answer instead “We wanted to give you the opportunity
to donate for this cause.”
• TD: Never open the donation box! If it is full you have to install
another one.
• TI: As you oﬀer a premium, the whole amount donated through the
higher price must be donated for the mentioned purpose. Please be
very careful with the records.
19C Test Statistics
The tables 4, 5, 6 and 7 show the actual (TI0) and imputed distributions for
the treatments in comparison between donation and no donation. Tables 8,
9, 10 and 8 show imputed distributions only. The imputed distribution was
generated as described in section 3 for TI1. We give another more detailed
example according to the comparison in table 9. In treatment TI2 and TD2,
the total amount of donations are 9.00 and 29.25 Euros, respectively. If
individuals in TI2 were restricted to a 30 Eurocent premium per beverage,
donations of 9.00 Euro would have been obtained if 9.00/0.30 = 30 bever-
ages out of 385 were purchased with a premium of 30 Eurocent (see table 9
cell TI2/yes). This leads to 385 − 30 = 355 beverages purchased without
a premium (see table 9 cell TI2/no). The same calculus would have led to
29.25/0.30 = 98.33 (rounded 98, see table 9 cell TD2/yes) beverages with a
donation of 30 Eurocent and 1798 − 98 = 1700 beverages purchased with-
out a donation (see tabel 9 cell TD2/no) in treatment TD2. Thus, when
comparing treatments TI2 and TD2 we compare the imputed distribution of
treatment TI2 in which 30 beverages sold at a premium of 30 Eurocent and
1203 beverages bought without a premium (see table 9 column TI2) – do-
nating nothing – with the imputed distribution in treatment TD2, in which
98 beverages out of 1798 beverages donated 30 Eurocent (see table 9 column
TD2). The analogical calculus is done for all treatments.
20Donation TI0 TI1 Total
no 1203 2081 3284
yes 300 366 666
Total 1503 2447 3950
Fisher’s exact P = 0.000
Table 4: Test of Diﬀerence between TI0 & TI1
Donation TI0 TI2 Total
no 1203 355 1558
yes 300 30 330
Total 1503 385 1888
Fisher’s exact P = 0.000
Table 5: Test of Diﬀerence between TI0 & TI2
Donation TI0 TD1 Total
no 1203 344 1547
yes 300 39 339
Total 1503 383 1886
Fisher’s exact P = 0.000
Table 6: Test of Diﬀerence between TI0 & TD1
21Donation TI0 TD2 Total
no 1203 1700 2903
yes 300 98 398
Total 1503 1798 3301
Fisher’s exact P = 0.000
Table 7: Test of Diﬀerence between TI0 & TD2
Donation TI1 TD1 Total
no 2081 344 2425
yes 366 39 405
Total 2447 383 2830
Fisher’s exact P = 0.012
Table 8: Test of Diﬀerence between TI1 & TD1
Donation TI2 TD2 Total
no 355 1700 2055
yes 30 98 128
Total 385 1798 2183
Fisher’s exact P = 0.093
Table 9: Test of Diﬀerence between TI2 & TD2
Donation TD1 TD2 Total
no 344 1700 2044
yes 39 98 137
Total 383 1798 2181
Fisher’s exact P = 0.001
Table 10: Test of Diﬀerence between TD1 & TD2
Donation TI1 TI2 Total
no 2081 355 2436
yes 366 30 396
Total 2447 385 2832
Fisher’s exact P = 0.000
Table 11: Test of Diﬀerence between TI1 & TI2
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